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Abstract
With the increasing popularity of small embedded devices, self-organizing and self-
repairing networks are preferable. One such choice are peer-to-peer (P2P) systems
which create an overlay network in the application layer to achieve a de-centralized
and resilient communication system. Neuropil builds an encryption layer on top of a
Pastry/Tapestry P2P network to provide confidentiality and integrity to a certain degree.
This thesis analyzes the protocol used by Neuropil in its default implementation and
explores some possibilities to improve the security.
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1 Introduction
This introduction shortly states the motivation, defines the scope and goal of this thesis
and explains the further structure of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
With the increasing popularity of small embedded devices, self-organizing and self-
repairing networks are preferable. One such choice are peer-to-peer (P2P) systems
which create an overlay network in the application layer to achieve a de-centralized
and resilient communication system. Neuropil provides an encryption layer based on a
Pastry/Tapestry P2P network to provide confidentiality and integrity to a certain degree.
The encryption is realized by exchanging public keys prior to admission into the Neuropil
network and subsequent messages are sent encrypted.
1.2 Scope
The scope of this thesis is to analyze the Neuropil protocol, from its implementation in
its initial version 0.1 from 2016-12-30, changeset b3c1c5eeee80.
Cryptographic libraries, in this case libsodium [5], are assumed as secure, putting the
main focus on the protocol and not on an implementation. As such the implementation
details of Neuropil are also a minor point for this thesis.
1.3 Goal
The main goal of this thesis is a protocol description of Neuropil to perform a security
analysis on it and provide insight on possible changes to improve the security of it.
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1.4 Structure
The remainder of this thesis has the following structure: Chapter 2 introduces some
basics of P2P systems and associated security considerations. The Neuropil protocol is
explained in chapter 3, which is analyzed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes.
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2 Related Work
This section explains the basics starting from peer to peer networks, a general under-
standing of packet based communication through the Internet is assumed. Afterwards it
lays out relevant work in the field of associated security considerations for peer to peer
networks.
2.1 Peer to Peer Networks
Peer to peer networks consist of several peers which form an overlay network on
top of the underlay network, usually the Internet. Each peer has mostly the same
responsibilities in the overlay network including storing data for later retrieval and
forwarding requests to other peers. Peer to peer networks classified as structured or
unstructured. The former assigns IDs to peers to create a structure, the latter relies
solely on network metrics such as latency for placement in the network. As Neuropil is
based on a structured network, we will focus on these.
Structured Peer to peer networks are usually based on a mapping of peers to keys.
These keys are used to create a distributed hash table (DHT) for searching purposes, by
associating an object with a key and storing the object, or a reference to its owner, on
one or more peers. While joining the network, the peer is assigned a key and thus a place
in the DHT. Each peer is responsible for a subset of the hash table and retains either
the data itself or a pointer to a node which holds the data. Usually a peer maintains
connections to several peers closest to its own DHT-Key, called leafset.
2.1.1 Tapestry
Tapestry [13, 32] is a structured peer-to-peer overlay network, implementations include
the Chimera project [19], which is used in the Neuropil implementation. The DHT-key
is an m-bit string, interpreted as b-bit digit, given that m is dividable by b. For example
a 256-bit string interpreted as hexadecimal characters would have 64 digits from 0-f.
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Using this key, a distance metric can be established by the numerically difference of the
keys.
Routing
The primary routing table at each node has b columns and m
b
rows. The row index
constitutes the size of the needed shared prefix. In row zero are the furthest known
nodes, which share no digits with the own node. The row one contains nodes which
share the first digit with the current node, and so on.
The column index is the needed digit at the next position. Thus a row with index i and
column index c, contains a node which shares a prefix of at least i digits and has c as
next digit. If multiple nodes fulfill the criteria, the one with the lowest network costs
(latency/hops/etc...) is used. If no such node exists the entry is left as null.
An active connection (in case of TCP) or a regularly refreshed soft state (in case of UDP)
is established with peers in the primary routing table.
A secondary routing table with alternatives is kept and filled with entries which are not
used (i.e. more expensive ones) from the primary routing table. The secondary table is
used if the peer from the primary table is leaving or has failed.
A list with so-called backpointers is kept with references to nodes which have the peer
in their routing tables. They are observable through the active connection or regular
heartbeat messages.
An example lookup is shown in figure 2.1. To forward a message to a key, the longest
matching prefix between the destination and the current node is computed. The length
of the prefix is used to select the row of the routing table. Starting at the column
corresponding to the next digit, it cycles through as long as the entry is null. If no
other peer with a longer prefix exists, the current node is responsible for the message.
The routing algorithm requires that the null entries of the lowest populated row are
consistent across the peers.
Joining the network
When a new node is about to join the Tapestry network, the bootstrap node sends a
message addressed to the DHT-key of the joining node. The replying node nc is the closest
DHT-Key in the current network and is used to compute the shared prefix α between
the joining node and the currently existing nodes. The joining node is announced to
be included in the routing tables of the other nodes with an acknowledged multicast
10
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d: 24565 a: 12346
b: 12356
c: 12355
Prefix 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
***** - a d - - - - -
Prefix 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
***** - a d - - - - -
1**** - - a - - - - -
12*** - - - a - - - -
123** - - - - a b - -
Prefix 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
***** - b d - - - - -
1**** - - b - - - - -
12*** - - - b - - - -
123** - - - - a b - -
1235* - - - - - c b -
query for object 12354
obj: 12354
root replica for object 12354
Figure 2.1: Routing example for a tapestry network. Node d looks for the object with
key 12354, for which the node c is the root replica. The routing tables for
the nodes d, a and b are shown in clockwise direction, starting at the top
left. The entry shown in bold is the next hop.
containing (α, InsertNewNode(α, nnew)) starting at nc. For the acknowledged multicast
nc forwards the message to all known peers sharing the prefix α. After receiving an
acknowledgment from all recipients, it sends its own. Receiving the same multicast
message from a node besides the initiator, an acknowledgment is sent to that node.
After the multicast is done and the new node is establishing itself in the overlay network,
it is given ownership of any stored object for which it is now responsible. As the new
node is placed in the routing tables of the nodes with prefix α, it has those through the
backpointer list. Using them, it can start to build its routing table through neighbor
discovery or by obtaining one or more routing tables of its neighborhood.
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2.2 Security in P2P Networks
By design P2P networks have several weaknesses, as arbitrary peers have responsibilities
for the function of the network, including searching and storing of entries, as well as
routing messages. According to Urdaneta, Pierre, and van Steen [27] the most studied
attacks are Sybil [2, 3, 6, 16, 26, 27, 28], Eclipse [23, 24, 27, 31] and Content poisoning
attacks [4, 9, 25, 27, 28]. Usual proposals to reduce the impact of these attacks include
computational puzzles or a trusted third party for admission into the network, quorums
for byzantine (arbitrary behavior) fault tolerance, redundant routing, and self-certifying
data.
A computational puzzle, or crypto puzzle, require a node to compute a solution to a
computationally hard problem. This is usually acquiring a nonce, so that a cryptographic
hash of the network identity concatenated with the nonce fulfills a condition, for example
having a certain amount of leading zeros.
2.2.1 Authentication
As stated in the RFC7435 Opportunistic Security [7],
[p]rotection against active attacks requires authentication. The ability to
authenticate any potential peer on the Internet requires an authentication
mechanism that encompasses all such peers. No IETF standard for authenti-
cation scales as needed and has been deployed widely enough to meet this
requirement.
Thus an open P2P network admitting everybody is currently not able to authenticate
all peers. The available authentication mechanisms include (pre-) shared secrets and
a trusted third party through a public key infrastructure (PKI). Using them to restrict
membership in the P2P network gives an additional hurdle to pass, in terms of acquiring
a device, certificate or locality.
If no authentication of the network peers is possible, the exchange of information might
be done similar to encrypted subscriptions, as mentioned by [20, 29]. By publishing
functions to establish whether a message matches a subscription, the message itself can
be sent encrypted although an out-of-bands distribution of encryption keys is necessary.
Pre-shared secrets include factory installed ones, as used by some IoT devices. However
as physical access to those devices is possible, the secret can most likely be recovered
as shown by Ronen et al. for a Philips Hue smart lamp [21]. The key was recovered
through side-channel attacks on the hardware and was used to sign attackable firmware
to expose the device.
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Another mechanism is by using a locality metric, for example the strength of a wireless
signal. For wired networks, membership in a secured local subnet might be used to
distribute a shared secret for later communications. This however has the drawback, that
the device needs to be bootstrapped at a certain access point. In the case of physically
mobile devices and communication through the Internet, the key would need to be
refreshed regularly, to avoid a possibly compromised key to be used indefinitely.
The way of a trusted third party includes the Certificate Authorities (CAs) and DNS
entries [14], which can be secured through DNS security (DNSSec) [1]. However the
verification through a CA also has its own problems of the CA being not really trusted or
responsible [10, 11, 12]. By extension these problems also exist for DNSSec, extended
by having only a single issuer for the root zone and possible loss of functionality if
DNSSec is not properly supported [17].
2.2.2 Sybil attack
The Sybil attack, as described by Douceur [6], entails the introduction of multiple malign
peers from at least one host. By joining the network multiple times with each host, the
amount of nodes controlled by the adversary rises, without the need for a one-to-one
mapping of host to node. The goal is the subversion of the confidentiality or correctness
of the P2P network, as the attacker has an improved chance to disrupt the function.
The probability to manipulate a query is (1− f) ∗ d, for a network with a fraction of f
malign nodes and average path length d, where d is usually logarithmic to the amount
of nodes.
To mitigate the occurrence of Sybil nodes, the admission rate of nodes into the network
can be limited. This can be done for example by increasing the cost of joining the
network in terms of resources or money. Limiting by resources can be done through
computational puzzles which needs to be adjusted to the resources of the weakest peer
and needs to be changed regularly. If the puzzle is not changed a single adversary
could still introduce an arbitrary amount of nodes. A possible random factor for the
puzzle could be to include a pre-defined and mostly unpredictable external value like
the Dow-Jones Index [31]. This consumes resources in any case and an attacker could
introduce up to ⌊ resources attackerresources weakest ⌋ nodes. The monetary restriction could be done through
a requirement that the nodes need to have a unique certificate issued through a CA and
verifiable through the PKI.
Another approach is establishing a distinct identity for each peer. This can be done
through network triangulation [2], by having each node include the distance (response
time) to several network beacons. These identities can be used to restrict the amount of
peers a single identity can introduce into the network. The drawbacks include the need
13
2 Related Work
for (trusted) network beacons and accuracy, as clusters will exists, for example a beacon
in Europe will see most peers in the United States with a similar latency.
To tolerate a small amount of Sybil nodes and still operate correctly, secure routing [3]
can be used. The success rate for an operation is multiplied by the amount of unique
paths to the destination, given that the destination is an honest peer. If it is used, insert
and update operations should always use the secure routing algorithm, whereas a lookup
can be done normally. If the lookup does not yield a result, it can be repeated with the
secure routing algorithm. The drawback includes the definition of a timeout function for
a lookup and the increased message overhead even in the absence of malicious nodes.
Using a social approach for use-cases where a social component exists, for example
instant messaging, the underlying structures of a social network can be used. By arguing
that this graph has few edges between clusters of malign (Sybil) nodes and honest nodes,
Lesniewski-Laas and Kaashoek [16] claims to create an unstructured, Sybil-resistant
P2P network, by using this graph as bootstrap graph. Connections between a Sybil
cluster and an honest cluster are thought to be expensive, in terms of establishing a
connection between a Sybil node and an honest node through social engineering or
similar approaches. Thus increasing f by adding more (inexpensive) nodes, the effect
is not amplified, as the connections between the node clusters requires the Sybil node
to establish contact through non-automated interaction on part of the honest peer (for
example adding to a friend list on the social network). The drawback of these approaches
are that a bootstrap graph needs to exist, and a mapping exists as in user a and peer b
are the same entity, which is part of the authentication problem.
2.2.3 Eclipse attack
The eclipse attack is described as more general than the Sybil attack [24]. By introducing
colluding attacker nodes at a disproportional rate into the routing table of a target node,
the attacker controls the message flow from and to the node, thus eclipsing it. This can
be used to prevent service from or to the eclipsed node or to exploit its resources. In
contrast to the Sybil attack it is a targeted attack and the attacker is not forced to control
a large faction of the nodes, only enough to fill the routing table of that peer.
Large DHTs can be hardened against Eclipse attacks for example through redundant
routing, requiring computational puzzles or employing the cuckoo rule and small scale
DHTs can employ a more rigorous authentication process, thereby limiting the amount
of malicious nodes in the network.
As argued by Zhang et al. [31], requiring computational puzzles with a changing
initialization vector (IV) for the DHT-Key generation hinders the ability to eclipse a node
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in a large scale network. Generating any valid DHT-Key takes some while and obtaining
several keys close enough to the target requires a large number of valid keys in a densely
populated network.
Another possible mitigation is limiting the in- and out-degree of the peers [24]. By
only accepting a certain amount of peers into the backpointer list and processing only
messages from these peers, a single node cannot be included in an arbitrary number
of routing tables. The drawbacks include the need to regularly audit the neighbors via
anonymous routing and pruning any connections which are not valid. Invalid nodes are
those with too many incoming connections, or if it is a peer from its primary routing
table, not being included in the backpointer list and vice versa.
To prevent a selective insertion through repeated join/leave attempts in the case of
network assigned DHT-Keys, the Cuckoo rule [22] can be applied. When a node joins
the network for the first time and is assigned a place in the DHT, some nodes in the
neighborhood are forced to rejoin the network at a different location. This has the
disadvantage of regular churn through each introduced peer, which can lead to frequent
ownership changes of published content and thus an increased message overhead.
2.2.4 Content poisoning
Being the responsible peer to store certain data or by pretending to be that peer,
an attacker can ignore the query, or send arbitrary data as answer. To detect these
manipulations, self-certifying data can be used. By signing the hash of the data with a
trusted key, a receiving node can check whether the received data is correct [4, 9]. This
requires acquisition and verification of the key through some out-of-band means.
2.2.5 Tolerating adversaries
To tolerate peers which exhibit arbitrary behavior, also called byzantine failure in regard
to the byzantine general problem, a distributed system can employ quorums. The
quorum needs to have at least 3 ∗ f + 1 peers, to tolerate f byzantine peers, to ensure
that there is always a majority of honest peers. Such quorums are applicable in a DHT
to ensure correctness of the routing [8, 30] and thus information storage and retrieval,
given that the target is honest.
For example the robust communication protocol II as described by Young et al. [30]
uses distributed signatures to prevent a peer to act on its own. The distributed key is
stored in shares among the peers and it takes a certain amount of shares to reconstruct
the secret/create a valid signature. There also exist a set of associated public shares
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which are used to verify signatures. Each quorum knows the public key of its neighbor
quorums and signs those to enable a chain of trust. A sending peer first informs its
own quorum Q1 that it wants to send a message and the quorum needs to supply a
signed proof that the sender is allowed to do so. One possible reason to deny the sender
would be excessive sending of messages (spamming). With this proof the sender can
contact the next quorum Q2 as computed by the routing table. The response of Q2 is the
next quorum Q3, the public key of Q3 and a proof that Q2 permitted the message, all
signed by Q2 and verifiable through the public key known to Q1. This continues until
the quorum Qi which contains the message target is reached, and the sender delivers
the proof of Qi−1 and the message to the target.
For these techniques to be effective the amount of byzantine peers, and their distribution
throughout the quorums, needs to be controlled. Thus admission restrictions (for
example the computational puzzles with periodically changing initialization vector for
the puzzle) and either a verifiable node-id generation and/or a mechanism to prevent
targeted insertion like the cuckoo rule needs to be in place.
2.3 Possible attackers
There are several classes of possible attackers in a network context with differing
capabilities. The stated attacks on peer to peer networks usually fall into the category of
malicious peers.
2.3.1 Passive network attacker
A passive network attacker is somebody who only reads the messages going through the
underlay network, but does not interfere in the message exchange. Any information
which is not encrypted can be read by this attacker. This can be the case if some
part of the routing architecture is compromised or otherwise compelled to provide the
information.
2.3.2 Active network attacker
An active network attacker controls (part) of the network and is able to capture, change
and replay arbitrary packets. It is similar to the passive network attacker, however it
actively interferes with the communication passing through it. Any non-authenticated
16
2.3 Possible attackers
encryption can be subverted by this attacker, as it can act as a man-in-the-middle and
forward and/or manipulate the data passing through it.
In regard to peer to peer systems it is capable to attack certain nodes as its capabilities
allow it to interrupt the communication between honest peers easing for example eclipse
attacks. Depending on the authentication schema it might also introduce malicious
nodes into a network.
2.3.3 Malicious peer
One or more nodes which are part of the network but do not necessarily follow the
protocol. This case is distinct from the active network attacker, as the malicious peer can
only manipulate the packets passing through one of its nodes. They can drop, misroute
or manipulate arbitrary packets passing through them and inject arbitrary packets into
the network. The arbitrary behavior is usually called byzantine failure in the context of
distributed systems and can appear for example if one server of a distributed system has
been compromised.
Additionally it might disrupt the protocol by inserting junk messages to generate unne-
cessary network load (spamming) and depending how new nodes are authenticated by
expanding its influence through additional Sybil nodes. Another possible attack could
be convincing other peers to send unsolicited messages to a target peer, for example by
faking a lookup request.
2.3.4 Honest but curious
An honest but curious node follows the protocol but wants to obtain more information
than it would need to follow the protocol. Any information, for which the exchange is
not authenticated, and at some point becomes known to an honest but curious node
could be leaked to it.
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Neuropil is a Machine-to-Machine Messaging System aimed to provide encrypted commu-
nication between two or more peers. The Neuropil protocol is based on Pastry/Tapestry
as distributed hash table (DHT) and uses it for routing of messages with an additional
public key exchange and encryption. The used key length for the DHT-Keys are 256 bit,
interpreted as 64 hexadecimal digits. The additions are both below the overlay network
to encrypt the messages for the next hop, and above to encrypt the message payload
separately from/to the application layer. All messages are padded and/or segmented so
that each packet is 1024 bytes long. It supports two different modes for acknowledging
packets, the usual destination only where the receiving peer sends the acknowledgment
and an each-hop mode where every forwarding peer sends one.
To initiate an exchange of application payloads, a peer announces an intent to receive
or send messages about a subject. To avoid the need to know the DHT-Key and/or
network address of each other, an approach similar to topic based publish/subscribe
networks is used through the DHT. The peer having the DHT-Key closest to the subject
key is responsible for the message discovery. This peer collects and distributes the
sender/receiver tokens of interested peers. After the initial exchange of interest tokens,
sender and receiver establish a point-to-point communication directly through the
overlay network (possibly through other peers).
Each node is identified through a DHT-Key of the overlay network as used by Pastry/Ta-
pestry. The DHT-Key is obtained through hashing the identifying information of a node
or message which are contained in an AAA-Token.
3.1 AAA-Token
The data structure containing the identifying information in addition to the public key
and a signature of the owner are called AAA-Token, which stands for authentication,
authorization and accounting token.
Identifying information includes a realm, issuer, subject, audience, valid from/to (time),
public key, optional extensions and a self-generated universally unique identifier (UUID).
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Realms and audiences are used for message filtering and may be empty. Currently the
values for realm, issuer, subject and audience are plain text, a future change to use
hashed values is intended.
The optional extensions are key/value pairs and might be used for use-case specific
information by the user of the Neuropil library. Possible uses include message authenti-
cation codes (MACs) obtained through a pre-shared secret, or a signature which can be
validated through a public key infrastructure (PKI). Currently the extensions are neither
part of the DHT-Key nor verifiable through the signature of the token, as some intended
purposes require mutable information.
The two main uses for the token are node identity and message sender/receiver intent.
For the node identity the subject is the issuer, for the message intent it is the subject of
the application payload.
3.2 Initialization / Handshake
The messages for joining the network are shown in figure 3.1. The left-hand side shows a
new node initiating the communication, which is the case when obtaining the bootstrap
node through some out-of-band means. On the right-hand side the bootstrap node knows
about the joining node, which might be the case if the bootstrap node is a controller
responsible for starting the other nodes.
The initial session key for symmetric encryption between nodes follows the elliptic curve
Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme. One of the nodes initiates the protocol
with a handshake message (1) containing the public key of the sender, to which the
other nodes replies with its own handshake (2). At this point, both know the public key
of each other. Using its own private key and the public key of the other node, a shared
secret can be computed.
After the handshake is complete, the initiating node sends a join request (3) to the
other node, to be included its routing table. Now the bootstrap node may evaluate the
information contained in the AAA-Token to either acknowledge or reject this request. If
it is acknowledged (4), the new node is part of the network (-realm) and the bootstrap
node proceeds to send a part of its routing table (5). The row with the longest shared
prefix between the bootstrap and the joining node is sent, or the leafset if that row is
empty. Also the bootstrap node announces the joining node to the closest peers it is
currently connected to, which may establish connections to the new node through own
join requests. This enables the new node to build its routing table and being included in
the overlay network.
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NN1 BS1
1: Handshake
[AAA−NN ]SIGNNN
2: Handshake
[AAA−BS]SIGNBS
3: [JoinReq]SBS, nn
4: [JoinAck]SNN, bs
5: [RoutingTable]SNN, bs
NN2 BS2
1: Handshake
[AAA−BS2]SIGNBS2
2: Handshake
[AAA−NN2]SIGNNN2
3: [JoinReq]SNN2, bs2
4: [JoinAck]SBS2, nn2
5: [RoutingTable]SNN2, bs2
Figure 3.1: NN = New Node, BS = Bootstrap Node.
Messages for joining a Neuropil overlay network. Left-hand side is peer
initiated, right-hand side is bootstrap initiated.
[Message]SIGNa is a message signed by node a, which can be verified with
the public key.
[Message]Sa, b is symmetrically encrypted using the ECDH derived shared
secret between nodes a and b.
AAA− node is the token containing the node identity and public key of the
node,
If a realm is used, the bootstrap node in the figure is the realm master. Should some
other node receive a join request it is forwarded to the realm master. The forwarding is
done through sender/receiver intents with the realm name as subject and sending the
AAA-Token to the realm master.
3.3 Message intent / Sender & Receiver List
The messages for a subject based message exchange (application payloads) are shown
in figure 3.2. The routing key for the sender/receiver intent is obtained by hashing
the subject name. The Neuropil node which is closest to this key is the intermediate
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Sender Receiver min ∆ Subject
1: sender intent
AAA-Token sender
2: ACK
3: receiver intent
AAA-Token receiver
4: ACK
5: sender list
of AAA-Token
6: receiver list of AAA-Token
7: Payload message
8: . . .
Figure 3.2: Messages for sending a message in the Neuropil overlay network.
’min ∆ Subject’ is the intermediate Node with the DHT-Key closest to the
Routing Key generated for the subject. All messages are symmetrically
encrypted using the ECDH derived shared secret between the corresponding
peers.
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node responsible to gather sender and receiver tokens. These tokens contain the subject,
whether it is a sender or receiver, the node identity, optionally a realm as intended
audience, and is signed by the creator of the token. Matching and thus filtering for
possibly existing audiences contained in the tokens is done by the intermediate node
before a list is sent.
3.4 Message parts
Payload message structure:
• Routing information: DHT-from, DHT-to, DHT-reply to, sent time, expiry time, sub-
ject, sequence number(monotonous increasing), a generated UUID for ACK/reply
purposes
• Payload key: kM symmetric key for the payload
• Payload
• padding to 1024b - signature length
• Signature over the message
For the payload message encryption, kM is used for symmetric encryption. Kn is the
public key of the next hop. Kr is the public key of the receiver as contained in the
receiver token. Each encryption step uses a generated random nonce:
• Payload: symmetric (kSm).
• Payload key: for the receiver, authenticated symmetric encryption with ECDH-
derived shared secret (Kr, ks).
• Complete message: for the next hop, authenticated symmetric encryption with
ECDH-derived shared secret (Kn, ks).
Control messages, for example join requests or pings, employ only authenticated encryp-
tion to the next hop. As those messages do not contain an application layer payload
additional encryption is not necessary. As a special case the ACK can travel through
several nodes and contains only the UUID of the message.
3.5 Example message flows
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0000
0777
2000
4000
4777
6000
Routing table of 4000
Prefix 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 0000 - 2000 - 4000 - 6000 -
4 4000 - - - - - - 4777
40 4000 - - - - - - -
Figure 3.3: Small example network with six nodes to illustrate several message exchan-
ges. Realistic distribution and density have been ignored to create a smaller
example. To show message forwarding between nodes, it is assumed that
the numerically lowest node is used, if multiple nodes could be used at one
point in the routing table.
Message discovery for sender 6000 and receiver 4777 about a subject that hashes to
0772, using the network shown in figure 3.3, and visualized in figure 3.4. For this
example it is assumed that the numerically smallest node is used for the routing table, if
there are multiple nodes for a prefix, resulting in several indirections.
Receiver discovery of the sender (Steps 1-2):
1. 6000: Sender intent for subject 0772, generation of AAA-Token [AAA− s]sign6000
2. 6000: Sending token to nearest known node 0000
[target : 0772, message [AAA− s]sign6000]S0000,6000
3. 0000: Receiving [target : 0772, message [AAA− s]sign6000]S0000,6000 and forwarding to
0777 as [target : 0772, message [AAA− s]sign6000]S0777,0000
4. 0777: As nearest node, matching known tokens. As only a sender intent is known,
nothing needs to be done.
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6000 4000 4777 0000 0777
1:
[
to 0772 : [AAA− s 0772]sign6000
]S
0000,6000
2:
[
to 0772 : [AAA− s 0772]sign6000
]S
0777,0000
3:
[
to 0772 : [AAA− r 0772]sign4777
]S
0000,4777
4:
[
to 0772 : [AAA− r 0772]sign4777
]S
0777,0000
5:
[
to 4777 : [AAA− s 0772]sign6000
]S
4000,0777
6:
[
to 4777 : [AAA− s 0772]sign6000
]S
4777,4000
7:
[
to 6000 : [AAA− r 0772]sign4777
]S
6000,0777
8:
[
to 4777 : [kM ]S4777,6000 [payload]SKM
]S
4000,6000
9:
[
to 4777 : [kM ]S4777,6000 [payload]SKM
]S
4777,4000
Figure 3.4: Subject exchange and transmission of payload messages. [x]SY,z denotes
authenticated symmetric encryption of x using the ECDH derived shared
secret with the public key of Y and the private key of z. kM is a random
symmetric encryption key, which is generated for each message by the
sender.
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Sender discovery of the receiver (Steps 3-4):
1. 4777: Receiver intent for subject 0772, generation of AAA-Token [AAA− r]sign4777
2. 4777: Sending token to nearest known node 0000
[target : 0772, message [AAA− r]sign4777]S0000,4777
3. 0000: Receiving [target : 0772, message [AAA− r]sign4777]S0000,4777 and forwarding to
0777 as [target : 0772, message [AAA− r]sign4777]S0777,0000
4. 0777: As nearest node, matching known tokens. Distributing [AAA− s]sign6000 and
[AAA− r]sign4777 to each other.
Distribution of tokens (Steps 5-7):
1. 0777: sending to 6000: [target : 6000, message [AAA− r]sign4777]S6000,0777
2. 6000: Receiving [target : 6000, message [AAA− r]sign4777]S6000, checking and saving
the token, ready to send application payloads.
3. 0777: sending to nearest known node 4000 [target : 4777, [AAA− s]sign6000]S4000,0777
4. 4000: Receiving [target : 4777, [AAA− s]sign6000]S4000,0777 and forwarding to 4777 as
[target : 4777, [AAA− s]sign6000]S4777,4000
5. 4777: Receiving [target : 4777, [AAA − s]sign6000]S4777,4000 checking and saving the
token, ready to receive application payloads.
26
3.5 Example message flows
Exchange of application layer payloads (Steps 8-9):
1. 6000: Sending application payload to 4000
[target : 4777, message [kM ]S4777,6000 [payload]SkM ]]S4000,6000
2. 4000: Forwarding the message to 4777
[target : 4777, message [kM ]S4777,6000 [payload]SkM ]]S4000,6000
3. 4777: Receiving the message:
[target : 4777, message [kM ]S4777,6000 [payload]SkM ]]S4777,4000
decrypting the symmetric key and verifying the MAC using the session key of the
public key from the sender token and its own private key. If successful, decrypting
and consuming the application payload.
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This chapter discusses how the general attacks on DHT’s are applicable to Neuropil and
possible mitigations against them. Most if not all mitigations incur an overhead in terms
of network load, computation resources and/or administration.
4.1 Network messages and attacks
Beginning from the handshake, the following messages are sent on the wire, for a joining
node A, bootstrap node B and their public keys KA and KB. Node identity (network
location and DHT-Key) of B needs to be known through out-of-band means:
Handshake 1 [target: B, [A, KA]signkA ]
Handshake 2 [target: A, [B, KB]signkB ]
Subsequent messages on the wire are symmetrically encrypted to the next peer, with
the shared secret derived by ECDH and use a new random nonce for each encryption
operation. The nonce is transmitted in plaintext with the message.
For initial setup of a sender/receiver relationship, signed interest tokens are sent to the
node closest to the subject key. The token itself is not encrypted as the node responsible
for the subject might be unknown to the sender/receiver. Message intent of sender S:
[target: DHT-Key of subject [S, subject, KS]signkS ]Snexthop
The application payload messages are symmetrically encrypted and contain the encrypted
symmetric key kP in the message. This key is symmetrically encrypted and contains a
MAC, using the session key with the receiver. Payload of sender S to receiver R:
[target: R, [kP ]S+MACKR,kS ,[payload]Skp ]Snexthop
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4.2 Eclipse attack
If a joining node can choose its own key for the DHT, eclipsing a node, a key or certain
parts/rows of the routing table becomes easier [23, 24, 25, 27, 28]. Usage of the
self generated UUID for the DHT-Key allows an attacker to generate many different
node identities offline and choose the best fitting to assume control of a known subject
exchange or leafset of certain nodes.
Possible locations to eclipse from the example in figures 3.3 and 3.4 would be 0777
to eclipse the message exchange of the subject 0772, or 0000 and 4000 to eclipse the
message flow to their neighbors 0777 and 4777 respectively. In an actual network the
rows with the shorter prefixes can be eclipsed easier, by aggressively announcing itself
and other (few) collaborating nodes. By filling the routing table, as well as trying to
beat the other nodes in the used metric, for example network latency, the initial long
jumps can be misrouted to a collaborating malicious node with a plausible DHT-Key or
dropped entirely.
A possible target would be the discovery of the realm master for joining nodes, which is
done through the usual sender/receiver intents without further validation. If a malicious
node controls the exchange, it can present itself or another malicious node as the realm
master. By subverting the actual realm master, a joining honest node can be refused for
a denial of service, or forwarded to a fake network to observe what it wants to send or
receive.
4.2.1 Preventing the joining peer to generate its own DHT-Key
By limiting relevant information to create the DHT-Key to verifiable data and/or having
the network generate and sign the random parts for the joining node, an attacker is
forced to repeatedly join and leave the network to gain a key close to its target. Verifiable
data in this case includes the network address, port number and publicly available data
like stock values. While restricting the data to the network address and port still allows
for a broad range of possible DHT-Keys, but gives a bound to the amount. By including a
publicly available and unpredictable value as IV for the DHT-Key, regular re-computation
of possible values is required, limiting the useful duration of a pre-computed identity
list.
If a realm master is used in Neuropil, it is responsible for authenticating any joining
node for its realm. Thus it could be used to generate the UUID for the joining node
and sign the resulting identity token. Other nodes can reject any join/update messages
containing nodes without a signature of a trusted realm master. To include several
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realms in one DHT network, a realm master could sign the identity token of another
realm to allow nodes to share the network.
For a joining node the message overhead is negligible, as the realm master needs to
receive the joining token in any case, and the reply with the signed identity token is
constant. As the node is not yet part of the DHT, the change in its DHT-Key should cause
no other updates at this point.
The space overhead to restrict cross realm communication is linear in the worst case to
the amount of realms. By collecting the signatures of other realm masters in its identity
token, including the realm master token along with the identity of the join/update
should incur a small message overhead, if the signature is missing. If the time of the
realm membership should be constrained, then a valid duration can be included in the
signature, leading to the following token for an other realm master identity, signed by
the own realm master:
RealmTokenother,own = [[AAA-RealmMaster]signother, valid from, valid util, PublicKeyown]signown
Cross-realm Handshake:[[AAA-Joining]signjoining]
sign
other,RealmTokenother,own]
This allows a node to validate the RealmTokenother,own against the public key of its
realm master and check the identity for the join/update request against the signature
of the other realm master. Thus the request can be allowed/denied without further
communication while restricting membership to authenticated peers.
4.2.2 Static key for subject
The subject name is the only part for generating the corresponding DHT-Key, thus if
the nearest node is attacker controlled the subject will stay attacker-controlled. This
allows the attacker to ignore any honest receivers for the subject and present itself as
only receiver to potential senders.
Currently the subject in the sender/receiver token is stored as plaintext, which enables
the any node in the path to the intermediate node to obtain the subject name. Without
further authorization between sender and receiver it cannot be verified whether each
other is supposed to send or receive messages about that subject.
Hashed subject names
The planned change of the Neuropil protocol by its author to include only hashed values
of the subject name prevents the other nodes, the intermediate node and the path to it,
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to obtain the name. The name could then be used as an additional shared secret for the
encryption or authentication of the message payload. This could be done by sending a
nonce in the message and using the result of an HMAC of the nonce together with the
subject name as initialization vector for the encryption function.
In addition, the algorithm for the Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP) [18] could be
used to concatenate the subject name with a timestamp, to prevent a permanent eclipse
attack against an unknown subject. The DHT-Key of the subject will move through
the DHT and cannot be compromised indefinitely after acquiring the hash value while
forwarding an intent. Given the ephemeral nature of the sender/receiver intent, the
message overhead should be negligible, if the time frame for the TOTP is similar to the
time to live of the intent. Calculating the next subject DHT-Key and introducing a node
close to it requires knowledge about the subject name.
4.3 Authentication
If no realm master is used, or if it does not require any authentication, then an arbitrary
amount of nodes can be introduced into the network. Additionally any peer can introduce
new peers into the network without further validation through an update message. The
method of authentication is left to the user of the library through usage of key:value
pairs in the extensions of the identity tokens, which are sent without encryption during
an handshake. Given the open nature of the extension, an authentication mechanism
which does not reveal an existing shared secret is preferable for example using it with as
key for a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) [15] over the identity token
containing the network address and public key of the node.
4.3.1 Sybil attack
Any node in the network can send update messages to announce new peers without
additional scrutiny, a malicious or compromised node can populate the network with
Sybil nodes. There exists no restriction on the amount of nodes one physical entity can
introduce into the network.
If the amount should be restricted, a differentiation of nodes would be required. The
stated target of embedded devices make resources constrained differentiation [6], in
which hosts are tested for distinctiveness by resource consumption not feasible. Using
the network address has the problem that several physical hosts might share an external
IP address through network address translation (NAT) and in the case of IPv6 currently
exists an overabundance of possible addresses.
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In a network with n peers, average path length of d ≈ log16(n) and a fraction of f Sybil
nodes, the possibility of a message not passing through a Sybil node is (1− f)d.
The vulnerable part of the protocol is the exchange of sender/receiver intents, as those
use the lookup and store operations of the DHT network without any other knowledge
about the responsible node. This allows a Sybil node on the path to an honest root node
for a subject to misroute, drop or assume control of that intent.
After a successful exchange of intents, the point-to-point semantic of payload messages
in Neuropil and encryption based on the contained keys limits a Sybil nodes along
the path to drop or corrupt the payload message. Using the each hop ACK mode of
Neuropil, the traversed path and possible black holes might be seen. A missing ACK
for the message can be used to initiate an additional send operation and nodes which
lose payload messages regularly might be removed from the routing table of the other
peers. To react as a network as opposed to a single node, in regard to missing ACKs,
non-repudiation of receiving the message is needed. A Sybil node might send an ACK
only to the previous node, discard the packet and blame the previous honest node.
Secure routing
Using secure routing [3], the message is sent to all entries in the fist row of the routing
table. By having multiple starting points for the message routing, more unique paths to
the destination node should exist. Two paths are considered unique if the forwarding
chain form the source to the destination shares no peer. This improves the successful
routing of the message with u unique paths to u ∗ (1− f)d.
The increased message overhead might be undesired, especially in a network with few
Sybil nodes, thus limiting the usage of the secure routing algorithm to situations with
observable routing failures might be preferred.
Replication
To eliminate the single point of failure, the node responsible for the exchange of the
subject can be replicated at different points in the network as outlined in several
papers [25, 28]. This forces an attacker to invest more resources to completely control a
subject and provides a higher tolerance against random failures. The drawbacks are a
higher space consumption and message load, although the space overhead should be
negligible, as the sender/receiver intent are relatively small and ephemeral. Classical
positions for the replicas are either in the leafset of the responsible node (e.g. replicated
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at the 5 nodes closest to the target DHT-Key) or by creating different DHT-Keys through
concatenation with some replica ID prior to hashing.
Replication along the leafset has the advantage that the content is still available at the
location after a node failure and the replication can be done through the responsible
node. If the root replica fails, the next closer node assumes control and initiates
potentially needed backups. If the responsible node is malicious, it might skip the
replication to deny access to it later, or as a member of the leafset, it might lie about the
replication and prevent the propagation through the leafset.
Concatenation with a replica ID has the advantage that the sending node can send the
messages to the intended locations/peers and by spreading the replicas throughout the
DHT more unique paths from a sender or receiver are possible. Assuming a cryptographic
hash function for generating the DHT-Keys, the replicas should be spread evenly through
the DHT, creating unique paths to the corresponding replica positions.
In regard to eclipsing the target space of a subject of interest with attacker nodes, the
concatenation with the replica ID should be better suited as it should create multiple
unique paths.
4.4 Authentication of the realm master
If the bootstrap node is not the intended realm master, or no realm master exists, the
joining node cannot verify whether it joined the intended DHT network. Due to obtaining
the realm master through the sender/receiver intent, any node from the bootstrap node
to the node closest to the DHT-Key of the subject can stop forwarding the intent and
present itself as the realm master. The bootstrap node then forwards the handshake to
the node claiming to be the realm master. This allows the malicious node to reject the
joining node and prevent access to the network, or having the joining node become part
of a completely attacker controlled network.
Classical means to authenticate the realm master include usage of a PKI, by including a
signature in the AAA-Token of the realm master which can be verified through the PKI.
If domain names and associated DNS records are used to distribute information about
the DHT network, the public key or a hash of the identity of the realm master can be
included in the DNS record and potentially secured through DNSSec [1] similar to the
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [14].
Through the DHT network itself it could replicate the message intent for the realm
master and use the majority in the returned tokens. To prevent non-bootstrap nodes
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from interfering with the message intents, the identity token of the realm master can be
kept by each node and used to validate future receiver intents.
4.5 Node auditing
If there is some trusted node, for example a realm master, and non-repudiation, the mes-
sage exchange nodes can be audited. By extending the ACK of a sender/receiver intent
with a cryptographic hash of the message content along with non-mutable header fields
along with a signature, non-repudiation of receiving the intent can be established.
An audit can be initiated by any sender or receiver node through an audit request,
forwarding such an ACK. The trusted peer then requests the sender and receiver lists
for that subject from all replicas. After matching the tokens by the trusted peer any
match can be asked whether it received the correct and/or complete list. If any ACK’ed
sender or receiver token is missing from the list, or a substantial amount of sender and
receivers got incomplete lists, the subject node is flagged as suspicious or eventually
removed from the network by no longer admitting nodes from that IP/Hostname.
Depending on the available resources of the intended devices and the trusted peer the
rate of audits might be fixed to prevent overloading some node.
35

5 Conclusion
Neuropil is suited against passive network attackers, as only the handshake is sent in
plaintext and any further communication is encrypted through ECDH derived symmetric
keys. Length and amount of payload messages can only be approximated, as all packages
are padded to 1024 byte and are indistinguishable from control messages.
Against active network attackers its suitability is defined by the authentication mecha-
nism used by a potential realm master. Definition and implementation of the mechanism
is currently left to the user of the Neuropil library. Without proper authentication, or in
the case of an open network, it is be possible to interrupt communication and eclipse
arbitrary peers.
In any case, given the peer to peer nature of the protocol, malicious peers are able to
gain control over parts of it. Currently the joining peer can pick its own place in the DHT,
enabling a malicious peer to pre-compute as many identities as it needs to obtain values
for eclipsing a target location. Additionally, new peers are only authenticated once
while joining through an honest bootstrap node and any node can introduce arbitrary
peers into the network through update messages. This can lead to either denial of
service of known subjects and, if no additional authentication of senders and receivers is
performed, inserting of fake data and information leakage respectively.
To mitigate the effect of an eclipse attack, the DHT-Key for a subject could include a
timestamp similar to the generation of a Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP) [18]
in conjunction with the planned change to include only the hash value to prevent other
network nodes to learn the subject name. This enables the subject name to function as a
shared secret which might be used as part of the initialization vector for the payload key.
Using for example Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (HMAC) [15] with the
subject name and a nonce and only including the nonce in the message.
To impede the ability to pre-compute a large set of possible DHT-Keys, an unpredictably
changing initialization vector can be used for the DHT-Key, for example the closing
number of a stock exchange [31]. If a realm master is used, the generation of the UUID
for the DHT-Key and subsequent signing of the identity of a joining node should be
done by the realm master, to prevent a targeted insertion at a specific place in the DHT.
Additionally a method to verify the realm master should be introduced, as most of the
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security is provided by the correct function and authentication of the realm master. This
could be done either through out-of-band means like a PKI or DNS entries or through the
network itself by using a byzantine resistant replication protocol to obtain the identity
of the realm master.
The extensions in the AAA-Tokens are currently not verifiable through the signature, as
some extensions might be mutable and these changes should not invalidate the token.
As some extensions are relevant to the routing properties, for example the target node,
any node forwarding a AAA-Token could prevent the owner from receiving any messages
through it. To mitigate this, the extensions should be a split between mutable and signed
extensions to ensure that routing relevant information can be verified.
To prevent malicious peers from forging the acknowledgment (ACK) for a message, a
message digest signed by the receiver could be included in the ACK. This doubles as
non-repudiation for receiving a message and could be used to identify misbehaving
peers, which are not properly forwarding messages.
Possible future work includes testing the feasibility of the implementation for smal-
ler/embedded devices as overhead in CPU cycles, memory and network activity are can
be prohibitive for battery powered BLE devices among others. Depending on the actual
use case and its requirements for peers and authentication, an evaluation should be
done whether a single realm master should be responsible for one realm, or using a
quorum as the realm master might be preferable.
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